Reiter's original definition of default logic allows for the application of a default that contradicts one previously applied. We call this condition failure. The possibility of generating failures has been in the past considered a semantical problem, and variants have been proposed to solve it. We show that it is instead a computational feature that is needed to encode some domains into default logic.
INTRODUCTION
Since the introduction of default logic [Reiter 1980 ], semantical problems of the original definition have been identified, and variants proposed to solve them [Lukaszewicz 1988; Brewka 1991; Rychlik 1991; Delgrande et al. 1994; Giordano and Martelli 1994; Mikitiuk and Truszczynski 1995] . One of the problems with Reiter's definition is that the application of a sequence of defaults may lead to failure. The following example shows this problem.
The default a:b c entails c whenever a is true and b is consistent with our current knowledge. The application of this default makes c true, therefore making the • P. Liberatore second default c:a ¬b applicable, which makes b false. This result is, however, in contradiction with the assumption of consistency of b we made for applying the first default.
We call failure the condition in which the application of another default makes a default that has already been applied inapplicable. In other words, if the application of a default contradicts the assumption of a default that has already been applied, this is a failure. The possibility of failures has been in the past considered a drawback, especially because failures may make the evaluation of theories like T impossible (i.e., these theories have no extensions).
A typical solution to this problem is to refrain from applying defaults that would lead to failure. This is done by justified default logic [Lukaszewicz 1988 ], constrained default logic [Delgrande et al. 1994] , and cumulative default logic [Brewka 1991; Giordano and Martelli 1994] . For the preceding theory T , the application of the first default makes c true, but the second default is not applied because it would lead to failure. We therefore conclude that T is equivalent to the propositional theory {a, c}.
This solution is semantically good, as it it allows for the evaluation of theories like T (i.e., it assigns extensions to theories that would otherwise have none). On the other hand, having forbidden failures can be seen as a computational problem, as the encoding of some domains requires exactly this "ability to fail." An example is the translation from reasoning about actions to default logic proposed by Turner [1997] . This translation generates all possible evaluations of a variable x by means of a pair of defaults :x
x and :¬x ¬x , and then removes the unwanted evaluations by generating failures. For example, the simple theory {Holds(Alive, S 0 )}, telling that Fred is alive in the initial state, is translated into the following default theory:
: Holds(Alive, S 0 ) Holds(Alive, S 0 ) , : ¬Holds(Alive, S 0 ) ¬Holds(Alive, S 0 ) , ¬Holds(Alive, S 0 ) : true false , ∅
Either the first or second default can be applied, but not both. Depending on which we decide to apply, we obtain Holds(Alive, S 0 ) or ¬Holds(Alive, S 0 ). The third default generates a failure whenever ¬Holds(Alive, S 0 ) is true. The only possible remaining case is therefore that in which Holds(Alive, S 0 ) is true. In other words, the first two defaults generate all possible evaluations of Holds(Alive, S 0 ) and the third default deletes the one we do not want. In general, some defaults generate all possible evaluations of the fluents and some other defaults delete the ones that are not possible. The latter are called killing defaults by Cholewinski et al. [1995] , who presented other reductions where killing defaults are used to delete unwanted solutions. Since this deletion is realized by generating a failure, these translations do not work for semantics where failure is impossible, such as justified default logic [Lukaszewicz 1988 ]. The inability to fail can be therefore seen as a limitation, as some translations from other formalisms into default logic require failure.
In this article, we consider the problem of translating default semantics that can fail (fail-prone) into default semantics where failure is impossible (fail-safe). In order for the results to abstract over the specific semantics, we consider a sufficiently general definition of "semantics of default logic" based on the concept of process Mengin 1992, 1994; Antoniou and Sperschneider 1994; Antoniou 1999] . In their first formulation, processes were used with the aim of automated deduction [Schwind 1990; Levy 1991] , but nothing prevents using them for alternate definitions of default logic semantics. In fact, many semantics that were based on a recursive definition over a set of formulae can be recast in terms of processes [Antoniou 1999 ]. We formalize the concept of failsafeness in this framework, and investigate the translatability from fail-prone into fail-safe semantics.
The translations we consider are polynomial either in time or size of the result. We consider translations that preserve the skeptical consequences, extensions, or processes of a default theory.
The least constrained form of translation is that translating the inference problem: Given a theory D, W and a formula p, we require the translation to produce another theory D , W and another formula p in such a way that D, W |= p holds in one semantics if and only if D , W |= p holds in the other. Such translations are possible in polynomial time between all semantics that have the same complexity. For example, we can translate Reiter's default logic into justified default logic in this way, as both semantics are p 2 -complete [Gottlob 1992; Stillman 1992; Cadoli and Schaerf 1993; Bonatti and Eiter 1996] .
We extend this result by simplifying the translation of p into p : We indeed show a translation such that D, W |= p holds if and only if D , W |= a ∨ p holds, where a is a new variable. Intuitively, the new variable expresses the condition of failure in a semantics that cannot fail: By setting a to true whenever a failure should be necessary, the generated extension implies a ∨ p, and is thus irrelevant to skeptical entailment.
Using this translation, the extensions of the theories D, W and D , W are not the same. We therefore consider translations that preserve, to some extent, the extensions: Such translations are called faithful [Konolige 1988; Gottlob 1995] . Clearly, no faithful translation is possible from a semantics that may not have extensions to one that always has. This is how Delgrande and Schaub [2003] , for example, have shown that Reiter's default logic cannot be translated into justified default logic. However, the question remains as to whether this impossibility is only due to a possible lack of extensions. We therefore restrict to the case in which the original theory has at least one extension and prove that an extension-preserving translation exists depending on what we assume to be polynomial: the runtime of the translation or the size of the result. The definition of faithfulness considered in this article is that each extension of D, W corresponds to an extension of D , W which is equivalent modulo the new variables, and vice versa. However, a different definition has been used by some authors [Janhunen 2003 ], who require the existence of a bijective correspondence.
Finally, we consider translations preserving the processes of a default theory. Processes are the basic semantic notion of the operational semantics for default logic Mengin 1992, 1994; Antoniou and Sperschneider 1994; Antoniou 1999] ; they are sequences of defaults that can be applied in a default theory. Since two or more processes may correspond to the same extension, two default theories may have the same extensions but different processes.
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Therefore, translations that preserve the processes can be considered the "most preserving".
DEFINITIONS
Default Logics
We use the operational semantics for default logics. Two slightly different, but equivalent, operational semantics for default logics have been given independently by Antoniou and Sperschneider [1994, 1999] and by Mengin [1992, 1994] . A default is a rule of the form
The formulae α, β, and γ are called the precondition, justification, and consequence of d , and denoted as prec(d ), just(d ), and cons(d ), respectively. This notation is extended to sets and sequences of defaults in the obvious way. A default is applicable if its precondition is true and its justification consistent; if this is the case, its consequence should be considered true. We consider the following two restriction: A default is normal if γ ≡ β; and seminormal if γ |= β. The latter is equivalent to β ≡ γ ∧ δ for some formula δ. A default theory is normal if it contains only normal defaults; it is seminormal if it contains only seminormal defaults.
A default theory is a pair D, W where D is a set of defaults and W is a consistent theory, called the background theory. The assumption that W is consistent is not standard; however, all known semantics give the same evaluation when the background theory is inconsistent. We also make some other assumptions about the default theory: All formulae are propositional, the alphabet and the set D are finite, and all defaults have a single justification. The last assumption is irrelevant for some semantics (e.g., constrained default logic) but not for others (e.g., justified default logic). The study of fail-safeness when multiple justifications are allowed is left as an open problem by this article.
We use semantics of default logics based on sequences of defaults. We typically denote such sequences by , , etc. We also denote · as the sequence composed of followed by . When is composed of a single default d , we also denote this concatenation by · d . Given a sequence and one of its defaults d , we denote by [d ] the sequence of defaults preceeding d in . This notation may be slightly misleading, as it gives the impression that a single element of a sequence is taken; however, this notation seems to be already established in the literature. We define a process to be a sequence of defaults that can be applied starting from the background theory.
Definition 1. A process of a default theory D, W is a sequence of defaults such that W ∪ cons( ) is consistent and W ∪ cons( [d ]) |= prec(d ) for every default d ∈ .
The definition of processes only takes into account the preconditions and consequences of defaults. This is because the interpretation of justifications depends on the semantics. All semantics select a set of processes that satisfies two conditions: success and closure. Intuitively, success means that the justifications of the applied defaults are not contradicted; closure means that no other default should be applied. The particular definitions of success and closure depend on the specific semantics. The following are the definitions used by Reiter's and constrained default logic, respectively.
is not a globally successful process.
The definition of processes by Antoniou and Sperschneider [1994, 1999] and that by Mengin [1992, 1994] differ mainly in when justifications are checked. In terms of our definition of processes, Antoniou and Sperschneider do not allow a sequence of defaults to be a process if the justification of a default is not consistent with the background theory and consequences of previous defaults. On the contrary, this is allowed by our definition and that by Froidevaux and Mengin. With the aim of automated deduction, the first definition may allow reducing the width of the tree of processes; on the other hand, the second definition is slightly simpler from a formal point of view.
We abstract the notions of success and closure from the particular semantics, and define them to be two conditions on and D, W satisfying some properties.
Definition 2. A default logic semantics defined in terms of two conditions of success and closure that satisfy the following assumptions is regular.
(1) If · is successful, then is successful; (2) [ ] is a successful process; 1 (3) success and closure can be expressed as the combination of a number of consistency tests over the formulae in and D, W ; (4) these consistency tests are independent on the order of defaults in ; and (5) the combination of results of these consistency tests can be done in polynomial time.
Most default logic semantics are regular: The only exception known to the author is the semantics of concise extensions, which is not regular because the condition of subsumption requires checking all possible default orderings [Rychlik 1991 ].
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We remark that the last condition does not imply that success and closure can be checked in polynomial time: They can only be checked in polynomial time once the consistency/entailment tests have been done. This is typically the case; for example, Reiter's default logic closure condition amounts to checking whether, for every d ∈ , either W ∪ cons( ) |= prec(d ) or W ∪ cons( ) ∪ {just(d )} is inconsistent. Once we have checked the consistency of W ∪ cons( )∪ {¬prec(d )} and W ∪ cons( ) ∪ {just(d )} for every d ∈ , determining whether closure is satisfied can be done in linear time.
An extension of a default theory is the deductive closure of W ∪ cons( ), where is a successful and closed process. Note that more than one process may generate the same extension. The skeptical consequences of a default theory are the formulae that are entailed by all its extensions. The credulous consequences are those implied by some of its extensions.
Fail-safeness of a semantics is formalized as follows.
Definition 3 (Fail-Safe Semantics). A regular semantics for default logic is fail-safe if, for every default theory, any successful process is the prefix of a successful and closed process.
This definition formalizes the idea that a sequence of defaults cannot generate a failure: If we can apply a sequence of defaults, then an extension will eventually be generated, possibly after applying some other defaults. In other words, the situation in which we apply some defaults but then find out that we do not generate an extension never occurs. Fail-safeness is a form of commitment to defaults: If we apply a default, we never end up with contradicting its assumption.
Fail-safeness can also be seen as a form of monotonicity of processes with respect to sets of defaults: If a semantics is fail-safe, then adding some defaults to a theory may only extend the successful and closed process of the theory and create new ones. However, this form of monotonicity is not the same as that typically used in the literature, which is defined in terms of consequences, not processes. Froidevaux and Mengin [1994, Thm. 29] have proved a result essentially stating that every semantics in which closure is defined as maximal success is fail-safe. As a result, justified and constrained default logics are fail-safe.
We recall that we assume that the background theory W is consistent. In this case, if a semantics is fail-safe, then every default theory has a successful and closed process: Since the process [ ] is successful, a process that is successful and closed exists. The condition of antimonotonicity provides an algorithm for finding this successful and closed process: If is successful and closed, all its initial fragments are successful as well. We can therefore obtain a successful and closed process by iteratively adding to [ ] a default that leads to a successful process.
While all fail-safe semantics give extensions to theories, the converse is only true in some cases. According to Reiter's [1980] and rational default logics, the simple default theory { :a ¬a }, ∅ has no extension, and these two semantics are therefore not fail-safe. On the other hand, every default theory has at least one concise extension [Rychlik 1991] , while the semantics of concise extensions is not fail-safe, as shown by the following example.
The default d 1 is applicable to W = ∅; the default d 2 is applicable after [d 1 ] because d 2 is not subsumed by d 1 . On the other hand, the process [d 1 , d 2 ] is not concise, as d 1 is subsumed by d 2 . As a result, [d 1 ] is a successful process, but is not the initial part of any successful and closed process under the semantics of concise extensions.
Translations
In this article, we investigate the extent to which fail-safe semantics are less expressive than fail-prone ones. In particular, we study whether one of the two facts to follow can be proved:
(1) Every theory under an arbitrary regular default semantics can be translated into a normal default theory under Reiter's semantics; or (2) there are theories under Reiter's semantics that cannot be translated into any fail-safe semantics.
Since Reiter's default logic is fail-safe when restricting to normal defaults, the existence of a translation of the first kind implies that every regular default semantics can be translated into at least one fail-safe semantics. However, the restriction to normal defaults makes such a result more general. Since most of the semantics for default logic behave like Reiter's on normal defaults (an exception is Rychlik's concise semantics [Rychlik 1991] , which is, however, not fail-safe), this result extends to all these semantics. In order to simplify the terminology, we formally define "normal default logic" as a semantics for default logic.
Definition 4. Normal default logic is the restriction of Reiter's default logic to the case of normal defaults.
Ideally, we would like results of the first kind to be exactly the converse of the second, that is, every regular semantics can be translated into every fail-safe semantics. However, this general question has an easy (and of little significance) negative answer: The semantics that has [ ] as the only successful and closed process is fail-safe, but none of the considered semantics can be translated into it. Indeed, consequence-preserving translations are impossible in polynomial time because entailment is co-NP-complete in this semantics, but p 2 -complete in most; faithful translations are impossible because this semantics always gives a single extension to a theory while the other may give more.
The results about the existence of translations depend on what we require from the translations. A minimal requirement is that the consequences are • P. Liberatore preserved. At the other extreme, we may require a translation to preserve the set of processes. In the middleground, and this is perhaps the most interesting case, we have preservation of the extensions.
-Consequence-preserving: The consequences of the translated and original theories are the same; -Extension-preserving (faithful) : For each extension of the original theory, the theory that results from the translation has an equivalent extension, and vice versa; the particular kind of equivalence used affects this definition, as noted next. -Process-Preserving: There exists a bijective correspondence between the closed and successful processes of the original and translated theories.
In all three cases, we assume that new variables can be introduced, as is common in translations between logics. Technically, this is possible thanks to the concept of var-equivalence [Lang et al. 2003 ].
Definition 5. Two formulae α and β are var-equivalent with respect to variables X if and only if α |= γ iff β |= γ for every formula γ that only contains variables in X .
In plain terms, two formulae are var-equivalent if and only if their consequences, if restricted to be formulae on a given alphabet, are the same.
The translations we consider may introduce new variables: A theory D, W that only contains variables X is translated into a default theory D , W that contains variables X ∪ Y . Preservation is assumed to hold modulo varequivalence: Preserving the extensions means that each extension of D, W is var-equivalent to an extension of D , W with respect to X , and vice versa; preserving the consequences means that D, W |= γ iff D , W |= γ for each formula γ that only contains variables in X .
Faithful translations based on var-equivalence of extensions have been considered by Delgrande and Schaub [2003] and by Janhunen [1998 Janhunen [ , 2003 . However, these authors do not exactly agree on the definition of faithful translation. The definintion of faithfulness used in the present article is the following.
Definition 6. A translation that maps D, W into D , W is faithful if and only if each extension of D, W is var-equivalent with respect to the variables of D, W to an extension of D , W , and vice versa.
Equivalently, the set of extensions of D , W , after forgetting [Lang et al. 2003 ] the added variables, is exactly the same as that of D, W . The translations used by Janhunen [2003] are not only faithful in this sense: For each extension of D, W there is exactly one extension of D , W to which it is var-equivalent, and vice versa. In other words, this definition imposes a bijection between the sets of extensions. Some translations by Delgrande and Schaub [2003] are bijective only assuming that the extensions of rational and constrained default logic include the justifications of defaults in the generating process. Some of their reductions are not bijective when extensions are defined in terms of consequences of defaults only, as in the present article.
Clearly, the impossibility of a faithful translation in the sense of Definition 6 implies the same impossibility for bijective translations. On the other hand, proving the existence of a faithful translation in the sense of Definition 6 does not imply the existence of a bijective faithful translation.
The condition of process preservation requires a suitable correspondence of sequences of defaults. We assume that the defaults are numbered, in both the original and generated theories. We could then enforce the consequences being either the same or var-equivalent; this is, however, not necessary, as polynomial process-preserving translations will be proved not to exist anyway.
A condition on translations considered by several authors is that of modularity [Konolige 1988; Imielinski 1987; Gottlob 1995; Janhunen 2003 ], the definition used by Konolige being slightly stronger than the one used by the other authors. Formally, a default theory D, W should be translated into a theory D , W ∪ W , where D , W is the result of translating D, ∅ . Another condition on translations which has been considered in the past is that of locality [Konolige 1988 ]: Each sentence and each default is translated separately. We do not consider modularity and locality in this article. The translations presented in this work are not modular.
A requirement we impose on the translations is that of being polynomial. There are two possible definitions of polynomiality, depending on what is required to be polynomial: the runtime or the produced output. This difference is important, as some translations require exponential time but still output a polynomially large theory. Formally, two kinds of translations are considered.
-Polynomial: run in polynomial time; -Polysize: produce a polynomially large result.
The existence of a polynomial-time translation from one semantics to another proves that any theory expressed in the first semantics can be translated into an equivalent theory in the second, and this translation can be performed in polynomial time. Such translations are usually considered good from a computational point of view because they allow solving problems about the first semantics using procedures developed for the second.
On the other hand, the existence of polynomial-time translations is not always related to the ability of semantics in representing knowledge. Considering the requirement of polynomiality of size, the comparison between two semantics can indeed be formalized as: "Is it true that for every formula in the first semantics, there exists a formula in the second that is equivalent and only polynomially larger?" A polysize translation from the first semantics to the second provides a positive answer to this question. Since the investigation reported in this article is whether fail-safe semantics are as expressive as failprone ones, polysize translations are even more relevant than polynomial-time translations.
The existence of translations depends both on what we want to preserve (consequences, extensions, or processes) and also on which computational • P. Liberatore Table I .
Theories Having No Extensions
Some semantics for default logics (e.g., Reiter's), may not assign extensions to some default theories, even if their background theory is consistent. On the other hand, all fail-safe default semantics assign at least one extension to every default theory. This argument has been used by Delgrande and Schaub [2003] to prove that Reiter's default logic cannot be translated into justified or constrained default logic, and by Janhunen [2003] to prove that seminormal cannot always be translated into normal default theories. The definition of faithfulness by Janhunen [2003] is different from the one used in this article because it also requires a bijection between the sets of extensions, but the published proof of nontranslatability from seminormal to normal default is still based on the guaranteed existence of extensions. Contrary to our results, the aforementioned ones have not been proved using the property of fail-safeness but rather the property of guaranteed existence of extensions. These two concepts are not necessarily related: We could define a default theory to always have [ ] as a successful and closed process if no other exists. This change guarantees that extensions always exist but does not affect the fail-safeness of the semantics.
Theories not having extensions can be removed from consideration by adding a single variable a and modifying the defaults. Indeed, the extensions of D, W and D ∪ D , W are almost the same, where D is obtained by adding a to all preconditions of the defaults in D and D = { :a a , :¬a ¬a }. The second theory has the same extensions of the first with a added to them, plus the deductive closure of W ∪{¬a}. In order to translate D, W , we may very well translate D ∪ D , W . This example shows that taking into account those theories not having extensions only results in the addition of a single extension to all translated theories.
This discussion is relevant because we actually prove in this work that some translations are made possible by assuming that the default theory to be translated has extensions. For example, there exists a polysize faithful translation from Reiter's default logics into normal or justified default logic if we restrict ourselves only to default theories having extensions. If we have to take into account theories not having extensions, such translations would resultingly be "almost" faithful in the sense that they always add a single extension.
Finally, theories not having extensions can be easily translated into a fail-safe semantics in a polysize and consequence-preserving way: ∅, {⊥} has indeed the same consequences of a theory not having extensions. This is to say that theories not having extensions can be considered (in the context investigated in this article) as a particular case. For all the aforementioned reasons, we only consider theories having extensions.
TRANSLATIONS
In this section, we show two translations from an arbitrary regular semantics into a normal default theory. The first is a polysize faithful translation; the second is a polynomial translation that is "almost" consequence-preserving. Both translations are based on the idea of "simulating" the construction of processes of the original theory. We first show how this simulation can be done, and then apply it for obtaining the two translations.
Simulation of Defaults
3.1.1 High-Level Description. The reductions we show are based on simulating a regular semantics using only normal defaults. Before going into the technical details, we explain the basic idea of the translation. For each default of the original theory, we introduce two variables that represent whether a default is applied in the original theory. Once the values of these variables are set, we can use other defaults for checking success and closure of the original process. The fact that extensions are generated only when the process is known to be successful and closed is taken into account in two ways:
(1) We use new variables and draw conclusions on the originals only when we know that the simulated process is successful and closed.
(2) If the simulated process is not successful or not closed, the extension we generate is a formula F ; the specific choice of F depends on whether we want a faithful or an almost-consequence-preserving translation, as will be explained in subsequent sections.
Given a default theory D, W and a formula F , both built over the alphabet X , we generate a normal default theory D F u , W u such that each extension of D, W is var-equivalent to an extension of D F u , W u with respect to X , and each extension of D F u , W u is var-equivalent either to F or to an extension of D, W with respect to X . Since all var-equivalences are with respect to X , we often omit the part "with respect to X " in what follows.
3.1.2
The New Variables. The new variables are of two kinds: the first are "scratch variables" which we use to draw conclusions without affecting the original variables; the second are variables representing facts about processes of the original theory. Such a fact is represented by two Boolean variables; this is because a fact about a process can be true, false, or yet-to-be checked.
-c i : tells whether the default d i has been applied in the original theory; -e i : tells that we "have taken a decision" on whether to apply d i ; in other words, the value of c i is not to be taken into account until e i is true; -o i : tells whether one of the formulae of point (3) of Definition 2 is consistent; and • P. Liberatore t i : tells that the value of o i now actually reflects the consistency of the corresponding formula.
Scratch variables are used to avoid giving a value to the original variables while evaluating consistency or entailment. For example, if we want to check whether a formula R built on the original alphabet is consistent, the default :R R would make R true in the original alphabet (thus constraining the extensions we are building). Therefore, we always use a different set of variables X i , and check the consistency of R by the default :
To be more precise, if we need to know whether R is consistent, we use two variables and two defaults, such as :R[X i ]∧r∧s R[X i ]∧r∧s and ¬R[X i ]:∧¬r∧s ¬r∧s . This way, r tells whether R is consistent in the alphabet X i , while s tells whether such a check has been done. If s is part of the precondition of another default, this default can only be applied when the check for the consistency of R has been done. This way, we can impose an ordering over the application of the defaults. Why such an ordering is useful is shown by the following example.
3.1.3 An Example. Before giving the technical description of the translation, we show how it works on a simple default theory using Reiter's semantics. Consider the following theory D, W :
The alphabet of this theory is X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 }. We need additional sets of variables, each in bijective correspondence with X , for example,
The background theory of the translated theory is obtained by simply replacing each variable
Some defaults of the translated theory correspond to defaults of the original. Such defaults can only be applied if the precondition of the original default is entailed and its consequence consistent. Justifications will be checked later.
The variable c 1 does not mean that the first default must or can be applied. Indeed, only its precondition and consequence is checked; justifications will be checked later. As a result, even if c 1 is true, the actual applicability of the first default in the original theory is not yet established.
The variable e 1 is true whenever either the first or second default of the translated theory has been applied. Since these defaults set c 1 to true and false, respectively, they correspond to deciding whether to apply the first default of the original theory. Since both defaults set e 1 to true, checking the value of e 1 allows telling whether this decision has been made. This is useful because some of the defaults to follow simulate the verification of closure and success of a process, and should therefore be applied only when we have decided which defaults are in the process and which are not. The same applies for c 2 and e 2 .
The second part of building a default theory is to check a number of formulae for consistency. In particular, for Reiter's semantics, we have to check whether the justification of every applied default is consistent with the background theory plus the consequences of all applied defaults, and that no other default can be applied. These tests can be expressed by the consistency of the following formulae:
The first formula is consistent if the justification of the first default of the original theory is consistent with the background theory and consequences of all other applied defaults. The last formula is inconsistent if the precondition of the second default is implied by the background theory and consequences of all applied defaults. Of course, we cannot directly use these formulae in defaults of the simulating theory, as otherwise we would constrain the value of the original variables. For this reason, in order to check the consistency of these formulae, we use four different sets of variables, namely, X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , and X 4 . The result of the tests of consistency of the formulae δ i is checked using defaults like the following two:
Thanks to these defaults, the variable o 1 is true if and only if the formula δ 1 is consistent; however, the value of o 1 is only meaningful after any one of these two defaults has been applied, that is, only if t 1 is true. Similar defaults are used for δ 2 , δ 3 , and δ 4 . In order to check whether the simulated process is successful and closed, we need to check whether o i is true for every applied default d i , and that either o i is false or o m+i is true for every default d i that is not applied (we are using Reiter's semantics for this example). As a result, we have to check for consistency the following formula:
If this formula is consistent, then W plus the consequences of all applied defaults should be made true. The following two defaults are used to this end.
Since both c 1 and c 2 are either true or false, the formula (c 1 → x 3 ) ∧ (c 2 → x 4 ) is equivalent to x 3 , x 4 , or both, depending on which of c 1 or c 2 is true. Note that this is the only default (together with the next one) in which the consequence is built over variables of the original theory. Finally, if formula S is inconsistent, we have to make F true.
We remark that if e 1 ∧ e 2 ∧ t 1 ∧ t 2 is true, then all variables of S are set either to true or false (i.e., there is no undefined variable). As a result, S itself can only be true or false. The usage of formula F will be clear in the following sections. For now, it suffices to say that whenever a process in the original theory is not successful or not closed, the translated theory generates an extension that is the deductive closure of F . Depending on whether the translation is supposed to preserve the consequences or extensions of the original theory, F will be a formula irrelevant to inference or a known extension of the original theory. Details on how F is defined are given in subsequent sections of the article, where specific translations are shown.
3.1.4 The Simulation. Given D, W and a specific regular semantics, the conditions of success and closure of a process can be expressed as a number of consistency checks over the formulae of D, W and . Let ω 1 , . . . , ω u be the formulae to be checked for consistency. These formulae may depend on which defaults are in , that is, they are not exactly Boolean formulae, as they may include propositions like (d i ∈ ), where d i ∈ D. The success and closure of a process can be checked in polynomial time, given the results of these consistency checks. By a well-known result in circuit complexity [Boppana and Sipser 1990] , every polynomial Boolean function can be expressed by a circuit of polynomial size.
The first steps of the translations are:
(1) For each d i ∈ D, we introduce two new variables c i and e i ; the first represents the presence of default d i in the simulated process; the second tells whether the value of the first is defined.
(2) For each formula ω i that is part of the definition of the regular semantics, we consider two new variables u i and t i that represent the consistency of ω i . (3) We introduce u + 1 disjoint sets of new variables X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X u , where u is the number of formulae ω i ; each of these sets X i is in bijective correspondence with X ; these variables are used to create new Boolean spaces in which to test consistency of formulae without affecting the original variables. (4) For each formula ω i that is part of the definition of the original semantics, we consider the formula δ i obtained by replacing each term (d j ∈ ) with c j in ω i , namely, δ i = ω i [(d j ∈ )/c j ]. (5) We build the circuit S(o 1 , . . . , o u , c 1 , . . . , c m ) that encodes the required combination of success and closure tests. This circuit has inputs o 1 , . . . , o u , c 1 , . . . , c m and a single Boolean output; whenever the value of each input c i represents the presence of d i in a process and the value of each input o i represents the result of the consistency check on ω i , the value of the output represents whether the process is successful and closed.
The translation from a circuit S into a formula can produce an exponential result if no new variable is introduced. However, we can introduce new variables, so this problem does not arise. When we write S(. . .) we implicitly include these new variables.
We give an example of the formulae δ i and the circuit S used for translating D, W from Reiter's semantics into normal default logic. The consistency checks to be done are u = 2m, where m is the number of defaults. Specifically, for each default d i = α i :β i γ i we have to check the consistency of the following formulae:
The formulae δ i are obtained by replacing d i ∈ with c i , and are therefore the following:
The circuit S(o 1 , . . . , o u , c 1 , . . . , c m ) encodes the success and closure of a process, provided that the consistency of δ i is represented by the value of o i , and that the presence of d i in the process is represented by the value of c i . For Reiter's default logic, we have
In words, for each default d i ∈ D, if d i is in (i.e., c i is true) then the justification of d i must be consistent with the consequences of all defaults in (i.e., o i is true). If d i ∈ D (i.e., c i is false), then either the precondition of d i is not entailed (i.e., o m+i ) or its justification not consistent (i.e., ¬o i ).
What has been shown are the formulae δ i and the circuit S for the particular case of Reiter's semantics. Similar definitions can be given for every regular semantics. The default theory resulting from the translation is the following:
Let the defaults of the original theory be D = {d 1 , . . . , d m }, and let d i = α i :β i γ i . The defaults of the translated theory D F u are defined as follows:
Each default a i represents the application of the default d i in the simulated process.
defaults make a default part of a process only if their precondition is entailed; this is the point of the definition of processes that ensure groundness of extensions.
-N = {n i | d i ∈ D}: Each default n i represents the choice of not applying the default d i .
Each g i relates the inconsistency of δ i with the value of o i .
These two defaults are used to compute the result of the circuit S and to "output" either the generated extension or F , accordingly.
The Proof. We use the following abbreviations: E for e 1 ∧ · · · ∧ e m and T for t 1 ∧ · · · ∧ t u . The preconditions of the defaults in D F u have been defined so that the defaults of A ∪ N have to be applied first. Then, the defaults of V ∪ G can be applied, and the defaults of Z can be applied only at the end. We prove a number of lemmas relating the processes of the theory D F u , W u with the processes of D, W . LEMMA 1. If is a successful and closed process of D F u , W u , then contains exactly one among a i or n i for each i, and contains them only in the first m positions.
PROOF. Since all defaults in D F u \(A ∪ N ) contain E as a precondition, and E is only made true once m defaults of A ∪ N are applied, the first m defaults of are in A ∪ N . If both a i and n i are in , then is not successful, as the consequences of these defaults contradict each other. If neither a i nor n i are in , then the default n i is applicable; therefore, is not a closed process. Finally, since exactly one between a i and n i is in the first m positions or , no other defaults of A ∪ N can be in a position of after the mth.
In words, the processes of D F u , W u begin with the application of exactly one of either a i or n i for each i. After this, no other default of A ∪ N can be applied.
The idea is that the truth value of c i reflects the application of d i in the default theory D, W . Given a process of D F u , W u , we define the "simulated process" O( ) to be the following process of D, W : [d i 1 , . . . , d i k ] where a i 1 , . . . , a i PROOF. Let 1 be the process obtained by replacing each d i with a i in and adding all n i 's such that d i ∈ . This process 1 is successful, and O( 1 ) = .
Since D F u , W u is normal, 1 is the prefix of a successful and closed process 1 · 2 . Since 1 already contains m defaults, no default of 2 is in A ∪ N . As a result, O( 1 · 2 ) is equal to O( 1 ), which is in turn equal to .
Together, these lemmas prove that the processes of D, W are in correspondence with the successful and closed processes of D F u , W u . Specifically, each process of D, W corresponds to some successful and closed processes of D F u , W u such that O( ) = , and for each successful and closed processes of D F u , W u , it holds that O( ) is a process of D, W . What is still missing is the effect of the success and closure of the process of D, W on the corresponding processes of D F u , W u . We prove two preliminary lemmas about the closed and successful processes of D F u , W u . LEMMA 4. Every successful and closed process of D F u , W u contains either v i or g i , but not both, for every i, in the positions of from the m + 1th to the m + uth.
PROOF. As for Lemma 1, after applying the first m defaults, the formula E is true but T is not. As a result, we can only apply defaults in V ∪ G. The rest of the proof is like that of Lemma 1. By construction, the default v i is only applicable if δ i is consistent, meaning that satisfies the condition ω i . For the same reason, g i is applicable only if ω i is not satisfied. As a result, cons( ) contains either o i or ¬o i , depending on whether satisfies the condition ω i .
We now establish a correspondence on the conditions of success and closure.
LEMMA 6. If is a successful and closed process of D, W and is a successful and closed process of D F u , W u such that O( ) = , then W u ∪ cons( ) and W ∪ cons( ) are var-equivalent with respect to X .
PROOF. The preconditions of z 1 and z 2 include E ∧ T and either S(. . .) or ¬S(. . .), respectively. By Lemmas 1 and 4, E ∧ T is entailed by cons( ). By Lemma 5, the truth value of each o i is related to the process satisfying the condition ω i ; since is successful and closed, S evaluates to true. Therefore, z 1 is applicable while z 2 is not. Since is successful and closed, z 1 is in . The var-equivalence of W u ∪ cons( ) to W ∪ cons( ) is due to the fact that the consequence of z 1 is equivalent to the latter formula after having replaced each c i with either true or false, depending on whether a i ∈ .
The converse of this lemma also holds.
LEMMA 7. If is a process of D, W that is either not successful or not closed and is a successful and closed process of D F u , W u such that O( ) = , then W u ∪ cons( ) is var-equivalent to F with respect to X .
PROOF. The proof is the same as that of the previous theorem, but S this time evaluates to false. Therefore includes z 2 , which has F as a consequence.
These lemmas establish a correspondence between extensions of the original and generated theories.
THEOREM 1. Every extension of D, W is var-equivalent to an extension of D F u , W u and every extension of D F u , W u is var-equivalent either to F or to an extension of D, W .
PROOF. If is a successful and closed process of D, W , then there exists a closed and successful process of D F u , W u such that O( ) = by Lemma 3. By Lemma 6, it holds that the extension generated by is var-equivalent to that generated by .
If is a closed and successful process of D F u , W u , by Lemma 2, O( ) is a process of D, W . If O( ) is successful and closed, by Lemma 6, the extension generated by is var-equivalent to that generated by . If O( ) is either not successful or not closed, by Lemma 7, the extension generated by is varequivalent to F .
Faithful (Extension-Preserving) Translations
Delgrande and Schaub [2003] have proved that Reiter's default logic cannot be translated into justified default logic. Furthermore, Janhunen [2003] has proved that seminormal defaults cannot be translated into normal defaults under Reiter's semantics. Both results imply the impossibility of translating Reiter's semantics into a fail-safe semantics. However, both proofs are based on a possible lack of extensions in Reiter's semantics. We therefore investigate whether theories having extensions under Reiter's semantics can be faithfully translated into a fail-safe default theory, namely, normal default logic.
A faithful, but exponential, translation from every regular default logic semantics into normal default logics always exists: If the extensions of a theory are the deductive closure of the formulae in {E 1 , . . . , E m }, the following theory is a faithful translation of this into normal default logic, where the e i 's are new variables.
This theory contains exactly one default for each extension of the original theory. Since these defaults are normal and their justifications inconsistent with each other, the successful and closed processes of this theory are exactly those sequences composed of a single default. The generated extensions are exactly the same (modulo var-equivalence) of the original theory. The problem with this translation is not only that it is exponential, but even worse, that once the set of all extensions {E i } has been determined, there is no reason for using default logic, as we can simply use propositional logic instead.
Polynomial translations can be of two kinds: Either the new theory can be built in polynomial time, or it has polynomial size. The first condition implies the second, but not vice versa. A translation from a regular semantics into normal default logic exists if we only require the result of the translation to be polynomial in size.
THEOREM 2. For every regular semantics there exists a polysize faithful (extension-preserving) translation that maps all default theories that have extensions into normal default theories.
PROOF. The simulation shown in Section 3.1 is "almost" an extensionpreserving translation. Indeed, all extensions of the original theory are translated into extensions of the generated theory. On the other hand, processes of the original theory that do not generate extensions correspond to processes that generate F as an extension.
We can build a faithful translation as follows: First, we determine a single successful and closed process of the original theory. We then translate the default theory D, W into the simulating theory D F u , W u in which F = W ∧ cons( ). This is a faithful translation because each successful and closed process of the original theory D, W corresponds to a successful and closed process of the theory D F u , W u generating the same extension (modulo var-equivalence). The processes of D, W that are either not successful or not closed correspond to those of D F u , W u that generate an extension var-equivalent to F . Since F is an extension of the original theory, this translation is faithful.
The translation of this theorem is not polynomial-time, as it requires the generation of at least one successful and closed process of the original theory. On the other hand, such a process has always polynomial size. The result of the translation is therefore always of polynomial size. As will be shown later in the article, no consequence-preserving polynomial-time translation exists. This implies as well that no faithful and polynomial-time translation exists.
Almost Consequence-Preserving Translations
A simple computational argument shows that any default theory can be translated into a normal default theory in polynomial time if we admit the queries to be translated as well, that is, D, W |= q in a regular semantics if and only if D , W |= q , where D is normal. Indeed, query answering is in p 2 for all regular default logics and p 2 -hard for Reiter's default logic, even in restriction to normal theories [Gottlob 1992; Stillman 1992] . However, for a translation to be "exactly" consequence-preserving, q should be the same as q.
A consequence-preserving translation is easy to give if we allow an exponential blowup of the theory: If the extensions of D, W are {E 1 , . . . , E m }, the skeptical consequences of D, W are exactly the classical consequences of E 1 ∨ · · · ∨ E m , which are also the skeptical consequences of the default theory ∅, {E 1 ∨ · · · ∨ E m } . Ben-Eliyahu and Dechter [1996] defined a better translation from default logic into propositional logic, which can be polynomial even if the number of extensions is exponential. Translations from default logic into propositional logic are, however, known to be exponential in the worst case due to the different complexity of the semantics. We now concentrate on polynomial translations.
The case of default theories having no extensions has already been considered, so we restrict our case to theories that have extensions. We have already shown a faithful translation that is polysize: This translation clearly preserves the consequences as well. In this section, we show a translation from every regular semantics into normal default logic that is:
(1) polynomial-time; and (2) "almost" consequence-preserving: If D, W is the original theory and D , W the result of the translation, then D, W |= q if and only if D , W |= a ∨ q, where a is a new variable created by the translation.
The translation is based on the theory that simulates the process construction of the original theory. As we have already noticed, the only problem with this simulation is that the processes of the original theory that either are not successful or not closed correspond to successful and closed processes in the simulating theory. Since these processes generate Cn(F ) as an extension, all we need is to specify a value of F that does not affect entailment.
The trick we use is to translate q into a ∨ q and to set F = a. If we use the skeptical semantics, extensions of the simulating theory that do not correspond to those of the original theory imply a, which in turn implies a ∨ q; as a result, they do not affect the skeptical consequences of the theory. The formula F and the way in which queries are translated are chosen in such a way that the extensions of D , W not corresponding to extensions of the original theory D, W are irrelevant to the specific query evaluation mechanism. As a result, if we are interested in credulous entailment, we can use F = a and do not modify the query q. This way, if a process generates the closure of F as the extension, this extension does not entail q and is therefore irrelevant to credulous entailment.
The question of whether the addition of a to the queries is necessary depends on the kind of translation used: We have already shown a faithful (and therefore, consequence-preserving) translation that is polysize. We will show that no polynomial-time consequence-preserving (i.e., that does not modify queries at all) translation exists unless part of the polynomial hierarchy collapses.
IMPOSSIBILITY OF TRANSLATIONS
In this section, we show that some translations are impossible: Specifically, there is no polynomial-time exact consequence-preserving translation and no polynomial-time or polysize process-preserving translation from Reiter's default logics into any fail-safe default logic.
Consequence-Preserving Translations
We have already shown a polysize faithful translation and a polynomial-time almost consequence-preserving translation. We prove that no polynomial-time reduction that preserves the consequences exactly exists. To this end, we show a problem that is hard for Reiter's default logic, but easy for all fail-safe default semantics. We cannot use a problem that has already been analyzed in the past (e.g., entailment or model checking) because these problems have the same complexity for Reiter's and for some fail-safe semantics.
For all fail-safe semantics, generating an extension is relatively easy, as it can be done by applying defaults until the process is closed. This property can be used to define a problem that is hard for Reiter's semantics but easy for all fail-safe ones: If it is known that all extensions either imply a or ¬a, then a single arbitrary extension suffices to check whether a is entailed. In turn, the assumption that all extensions either imply a or ¬a is equivalent to the assumption that the default theory implies either a or ¬a. We prove that entailment is hard for Reiter's default logic even under this assumption. We reduce the problem of telling whether x ∈ P to the problem T |= a, where T is a default theory that either implies a or ¬a.
Since P is in p 2 , the question x ∈ P can be reduced to the problem of checking the existence of extensions of a default theory with an empty background theory D p , ∅ [Gottlob 1992 ]. Since P is in p 2 , its complementary problem is in p 2 as well. As a result, the question x ∈ P can therefore be reduced to the existence of extensions of another theory D n , ∅ . Therefore, x ∈ P if and only if D p , ∅ has extensions while D n , ∅ does not, and vice versa if x ∈ P .
Let a be a variable that is mentioned neither in D p nor in D n . The default theory we use is the following:
The only two defaults that can be applied from the background theory are the first two. They cannot be applied together, however. Once the first is applied, the theory becomes equivalent to D p , {a} , while application of the second makes it equivalent to D n , {¬a} . Since the existence of extensions for these two theories is related to the question x ∈ P , we have:
(1) If x ∈ P , all extensions of T imply a; and (2) if x ∈ P , all extensions of T imply ¬a.
As a result, either T |= a or T |= ¬a. In particular, T |= a if and only if x ∈ P .
The same problem is relatively easy for every fail-safe default semantics. Indeed, to solve it, we only need to generate an extension and check whether it implies a or ¬a: Since all extensions are the same as for the entailment of a and ¬a, checking one extension suffices. Since generating an arbitrary extension can be done easily in every fail-safe semantics, the following theorem holds.
THEOREM 5. Check whether T |= a is in p 2 , for every fail-safe semantics, if either T |= a or T |= ¬a.
PROOF. Since all extensions of T either imply a or ¬a, we can check whether T |= a by finding a single extension E of T and then checking whether E |= a. Finding one extension E is easy because the semantics is fail-safe. If is a successful process that is not closed, then there exists such that · is successful and closed. The first assumption about the condition of success is that if · is successful, then so is . This algorithm only takes a polynomial number of steps if we have access to an NP-oracle. Indeed, all we need do is check closure of and success of · [d ] at each step; these conditions can be verified in polynomial time by letting the NP-oracle perform the consistency tests.
As a result of these two theorems, no polynomial-time consequencepreserving translation exists from Reiter's semantics to an arbitrary fail-safe semantics, unless p 2 ∩ p 2 = p 2 . The following theorem shows that even a polynomial number of calls to an NP-oracle does not suffice to translate from Reiter's semantics to any fail-safe one. THEOREM 6. If there exists an (exact) consequence-preserving translation from Reiter's semantics into any fail-safe semantics that only requires a polynomial number of calls to an NP-oracle, then
PROOF. If such a translation exists, then for any P ∈ p 2 ∩ p 2 we could translate the question x ∈ P into the question T |= a under Reiter's semantics, where either T |= a or T |= ¬a, thanks to Theorem 4. In turns with a polynomial number of calls to the oracle we can translate the question into the same question for a fail-safe semantics thanks to Theorem 5, where it can be solved with a polynomial number of other calls to the oracle.
Since no translation employing a polynomial number of calls to an NP-oracle exists, nor does a polynomial-time translation. Since the theorem has been proved using only theories in which all extensions have the same behavior with respect to the query (either they all entail it, or they all entail their negation) this result holds for both skeptical and credulous reasoning.
The impossibility of polynomial-time faithful translations is a consequence of the preceding theorem: A faithful translation is also consequence-preserving, and therefore cannot be polynomial-time. 
Process-Preserving Translations
A process-preserving translation is a translation that not only preserves the extensions, but also the successful and closed processes of a default theory. Clearly, we cannot enforce the processes to be exactly the same, otherwise the two theories would have the same defaults. Therefore, we only impose that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the defaults of the original and generated theories. The correspondence between processes is then based on the correspondence between defaults.
An easy way to create this correspondence is to assume that the first part D of a default theory D, W is a sequence of defaults, rather than a set. In other words, we add an enumeration on the defaults so that we can write • P. Liberatore D = {d 1 , . . . , d m }. A process-preserving translation is a function that maps a default theory {d 1 , . . . , d m }, W into another default theory {d 1 , . . . , d m }, W with the same number of defaults, and such that [d i 1 , . . . , d i r ] is a successful and closed process of the first theory if and only if [d i 1 , . . . , d i r ] is a successful and closed process of the second.
We prove that there is no polynomial-time or polysize process-preserving translation from Reiter's default logic into any fail-safe default logic. With this aim, we show a problem that is hard in Reiter's default logic, but easy in all fail-safe semantics.
Definition 7 (Completability of Processes). Given a default theory D, W and a sequence of defaults , the completability of processes is determined by checking whether there exists a successful and closed process · .
The following theorem characterizes the complexity of completability of processes for Reiter's semantics.
THEOREM 8. The problem of completability of processes is p 2 -complete in Reiter's default logic, even for theories that have extensions.
PROOF. Membership: Guess a sequence of defaults
and check whether · is a successful and closed process. Hardness: We reduce the problem of existence of extensions to this: Given a theory D, W we build the theory D , W , where D = {d n , d p } ∪ D and d n , d p , and D are defined as follows.
This theory, as required, has one extension, namely, that generated by the process [d n ]. The other processes, if any, are made of d p followed by the defaults that correspond to the successful and closed processes of D, W . As a result, the consistent process [d p ] can be extended to form a consistent and closed process if and only if D, W has extensions.
The problem of completability of extensions is relatively easy for all fail-safe semantics, as it amounts to checking whether is a successful process. By definition, indeed, any successful process is either closed or can be extended to form a successful and closed process. Moreover, if is neither a process nor successful, then it cannot be extended to generate a successful process, thanks to the antimonotonicity of success.
As a result, completability of processes is equivalent to verifying whether a sequence of defaults is a successful process, which is a problem in p 2 . For the fail-safe semantics defined in the literature, the problem is even simpler, as it is in D p . We prove that this is hard in the same class for justified default logic for the sake of completeness. THEOREM 9. Checking whether is a successful process is in p 2 for every regular default semantics, and is D p -complete for justified default logic.
PROOF. The conditions of being a process and successful can be computed in polynomial time once a number of consistency tests have been performed. The problem is therefore in p 2 . For the case of justified default logic, these consistency tests are independent of each other, that is, the formulae to check do not depend on results of the other tests. As a result, the problem is in D p .
The hardness result is an obvious consequence of the fact that the applicability of a single default is hard: The problem sat-unsat (i.e., checking whether a pair of formulae α, β is composed of a satisfiable formula α and an unsatisfiable formula β) is D p -hard. This problem can indeed be reduced to the problem of checking whether [d ] is a successful and closed process of the theory to follow:
The sequence of defaults [d ] is in fact a successful process if and only if ¬β is valid (i.e., β is inconsistent) and α is consistent. As a result, the problem is D p -hard.
Suppose that there exists a process-preserving translation from Reiter's default logic to any fail-safe default logics. We can then solve the problem of completability of a process in Reiter's default logic by simply translating both the theory and the process, and then solving the problem in the fail-safe default semantics. This would imply that p 2 = p 2 . This result can be strengthened to polysize translations. We can indeed prove that the problem of completability of processes is not simplified by a preprocessing phase. This is proved by showing that the problem of completability of processes is ; p 2 -hard for Reiter's default logics, and therefore cannot be "compiled to" p 2 . The class ; p 2 has been introduced by Cadoli et al. [2002] and Liberatore [2001] to characterize the complexity of problems when the preprocessing of a problem is allowed. We omit the details here, and refer the reader to the aforementioned papers. THEOREM 10. The problem of completability of processes is ; p 2 -complete in Reiter's default logic, where the default theory is the fixed part of the instance.
PROOF. We adapt the reduction by Gottlob [1992] as follows: Given a formula ∃X ∀Y . ¬φ where |X | = |Y | = n and φ contains only clauses of three literals, let A = {γ 1 , . . . , γ m } be the set of all clauses of three literals over the alphabet X ∪ Y . We then build a default theory and a successful process of it as follows:
where: p i = : c i ∧ e i c i ∧ e i n i = : ¬c i ∧ e i ¬c i ∧ e i be faithfully translated into normal or justified theories in polynomial time), but not in terms of expressibility (e.g., for every Reiter's theory there exists an equivalent normal or justified theory of polynomial size). This distinction is important because it shows that fail-prone are better than fail-safe semantics in solving problems by translating them into default logic, but not in encoding domains in polynomial space. In short, the possible failure of processes is a computational advantage, but not an expressiveness advantage. These results hold only under some assumptions: The reductions are constrained to be polynomial (either in time or space) but can introduce new variables. Moreover, we only consider theories that have extensions, and prove the existence of translations only for normal default logic, which we considered a prototypical fail-safe semantics. These assumptions make the results of this article incomparable to what was proved in two similar works:
(1) Delgrande and Schaub [2003] have shown reductions from other variants of default logics into Reiter's; they take into account theories having no extensions, and limit to the specific case of justified, constrained, and rational default logic.
(2) Janhunen [2003] has shown that Reiter's default logic can be translated into seminormal default logic; translations are assumed not only faithful but also modular, and theories having no extensions are taken into account.
Both of these two works consider polynomial faithful translations with new variables. The results presented in our article are more general than those previously mentioned in the sense that we proved the existence of translations from an arbitrary regular default theory into a fail-safe one and the nonexistence of a translation from Reiter's semantics into an arbitrary fail-safe semantics.
Some apparent contradictions between the results proved in this article and those by Delgrande and Schaub and Janhunen are due to the fact that we only consider default theories having extensions. This is why, for example, some results concerning the impossibility of translations by Delgrande and Schaub [2003, Thm. 6 ] and by Janhunen [2003, Thm. 5 ], which rely on the possible nonexistence of extensions in Reiter's semantics, are not in contradiction with our results on the existence of such reductions. These apparent contradictions show that some translations are only impossible because of a possible lack of extensions, and become possible as soon as theories having no extensions are excluded from consideration.
An interesting question left open by the present work is whether the comparison between fail-safe and fail-prone semantics can be extended to logics that are not based on defaults. Clearly, a suitable definition of failure is needed; however, it seems somehow natural to consider propositional circumscription [Lifschitz 1994 ] as a fail-safe nonmonotonic logic (we add negative literals to a theory as far as possible, but never retract an added literal) and autoepistemic logic [Moore 1985] as fail-prone (we can "generate" a conclusion x by means of a formula like x → x, but then retract the conclusion if a condition F is met, by means of a formula like F → ¬x). Another question left open by this article is whether the faithful polysize translation from a regular to a fail-safe semantics can be modified to guarantee a bijective correspondence between extensions of the original and translated theories.
Finally, we note that frameworks for comparing propositional knowledge representation formalisms have been given by Cadoli et al. [2000] and Penna [2000] . The translations considered in these frameworks are allowed to translate queries (or models), while the only translation of queries admitted in this article is the addition of a literal to queries, namely, q is translated into a ∨ q.
